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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and scholars consider the problem of constitutional adju-
dication in a variety of ways. For example, scholars have considered
the nature and limits of judicial activism.1 In addition, numerous
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. J.D. 1982, Indi-
ana University; Ph.D. 1976, Indiana University, A.B. 1972, University of Virginia. The au-
thor's thanks go to Robert C. Post, who is, of course, nevertheless blameless with respect to
what follows.
1. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3
(1971) (positing judicial role of applying neutral principles to constitutional problems rather
than usingjudges' values in deciding cases);Johnson, The Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the
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scholars disagree about the proper role of original intent, of the
constitutional text itself, of tradition, and of popular and judicial
moral reasoning in the process of constitutional adjudication.2
In light of this unresolved controversy, it may seem irresponsible
to divide constitutional adjudication along the unfamiliar lines of
two new models. The two models, however, do not merely compli-
cate an already unmanageable set of theoretical problems. Focusing
on these new approaches allows us to clarify the structure of consti-
tutional law and to develop advantageous ways of resolving consti-
tutional issues.
Case law already implicitly incorporates these models. They cut
directly across the more familiar distinctions between judicial activ-
ism and restraint, interpretivism and non-interpretivism, and ideo-
logical conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism.3 The two models
provide students of the law a new framework with which to read
familiar constitutional cases in illuminating ways. Most importantly,
the two models assist in promoting better reasoned constitutional
adjudication. In particular, recognition of these two models en-
hances legitimate democratic influences on constitutional adjudica-
tion, as opposed to giving free rein to the philosophical
idiosyncracies of appellate judges, while simultaneously preserving
Other Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455, 463-69 (1977) (asserting that constitutional
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers circumscribe judiciary in reviewing matters
involving legislative and executive decisions); Posner, The Meaning ofJudicial Self-Restraint, 59
IND. LJ. 1, 10-18 (1983) (discussing role ofjudiciary as check on government institutions but
only to extent allowed by Constitution and intent of framers).
2. See, e.g., Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Non-Interpretive judicial Review, 8 U.
DA-roN L. REv. 447, 451-58 (1983) (describing role of pre-constitutional rules of interpreta-
tion in theory that judges should look to original intent rather than creating law); Bork, Styles
in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. T x. LJ. 383, 383-84 (1985) (expanding on Madisonian dilemma
of rule by majority versus rule by authoritative minority); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rav. 204, 209-17 (1980) (comparing originalism, which os-
tensibly follows framers' intent, with intentionalism, which seeks to interpret that intent);
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 707-10 (1975) (contrasting
role ofjudiciary as interpreter of Constitution with role as expounder of national values); Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82
Nw. U.L. REv. 226, 232-36 (1988) (relating theory that judges should be restrained by text of
Constitution rather than by historical intention of its framers); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitu-
tion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 362-65 (1981) (expounding on effects of stare decisis and common
law rules on original intent); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Consti-
tutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 557-61 (1984) (discussing tradition as provid-
ing authority behind Constitution and asserting that judiciary validates Constitution in its
decisions); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1482, 1491-95 (1985) (drawing relationship between authority,
justification, and history as factors in formulation and interpretation of Constitution and fram-
ers' intent).
3. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide
Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 872-74 (1990) (discussing famil-
iar disagreements generated by constitutional adjudication and asserting that they are funda-
mental to any approach to constitutional interpretation).
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the status of constitutional provisions as barriers to the tyranny of
the numerical majority.
4
The two models borrow, somewhat loosely, basic ideas and termi-
nology from two schools of thought which cut across the philosophi-
cal fields of epistemology and ethics. 5 Borrowing terminology and
some primary concepts, the two models elucidated in this article
may be referred to as the foundationalist 6 and the coherentist 7 mod-
els of constitutional adjudication. The distinction between founda-
tionalism and coherentism will be explored at some length in Part
III of this article. For present purposes, suffice it to say that founda-
tionalism and coherentism in the constitutional context present dif-
ferent structural relationships between constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory provisions.
According to constitutional foundationalism, the relations of jus-
tification between constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provi-
sions exclusively conform to a strict hierarchy.8 Foundationalists
simply assume that constitutional provisions are justified as long as
attention is confined to the legal system.9 Whether constitutional
norms are justified, outside the legal system, by their self-evident
4. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1689
(1984) (explaining Constitution's role as check on illegitimate exercise of political power by
numerical majority). The classicjurisprudential discussion of majoritarian tyranny is found in
the writings ofJames Madison. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(advocating Constitution as means of validating minority rights and halting majoritarian tyr-
anny). The classic discussion of the value of freedom of speech, as exercised by unpopular
minorities in particular, is that ofJohn Stuart Mill. See generally J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz
ed. 1975) (asserting value of free speech as exercised by unpopular minorities to counter
oppression by majority).
5. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (relating philosophical contexts in which
foundationalism and coherentism have been applied).
6. See, e.g., Alston, Two Types of Foundationalism, 73J. PHIL. 165, 165-70 (1976) (propos-
ing theory of beliefjustification based on structural notion that certain beliefs provide founda-
tion for others); Annis, Epistemic Foundationalism, 31 PHIL. STUDIES 345, 347-50 (1977)
(theorizing that truth is based on self-justified basic statements); Van Cleve, Foundationalism,
Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle, 88 PHIL. REv. 55, 55-57 (1979) (suggesting existence
of class of immediately justified propositions).
7. See, e.g., B. BLANSHARD, THE NATURE OF THOUGHT 212-31 (1964) (setting forth coher-
ence theory of truth where beliefs mutually support each other); Chisholm, On the Nature of
Empirical Evidence, in EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE: READINGS FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES 224,
231-37 (R. Chisholm & R. Swartz eds. 1973) (outlining coherence theory of perception that
people attempt to justify perception with personal sets of beliefs); Quine, On What There Is, in
FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 1, 130-32 (2d rev. ed. 1980) (discussing coherence theory of
reference in which it is possible that concepts in one theory may be relevant to second theory,
even though when applied to second theory, concepts are no longer definable in terms of first
theory).
8. See Annis, supra note 6, at 345-46 (defining foundationalism as hierarchical relation-
ship between ideas, with certain ideas forming basis for others because of their self-justified
nature); Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76 (recounting foundationalist hierarchy where second-
order beliefs stem directly from self-evident basic ideas).
9. See Annis, supra note 6, at 345- 46 (assuming that certain values are justified on their
own in that their self-evidence justifies their position as foundation for other beliefs).
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nature, indubitable validity, or by moral principles outside the con-
stitutional system, a foundationalist system of case adjudication ac-
cepts those constitutional norms as given.' 0 As the foundation of
the legal system, constitutional provisions validate and demarcate
the legitimate content and scope of related statutes." In turn, con-
stitutional and statutory provisions act together in justifying and cir-
cumscribing the legitimate content of administrative regulations. 12
Foundationalism is thus hierarchical.
A crucial feature of foundationalism requires explication. Accord-
ing to constitutional foundationalism, the asymmetric relationships
ofjustification or legitimate infusion of content flow in only one di-
rection. 13 Whether we think of constitutional provisions as the
"higher" or more "basic" law, constitutional foundationalism holds
that while constitutional provisions may justify or provide legitimate
substance to statutes, the converse is untenable.' 4 A statute cannot
properly delimit or provide substance to a constitutional provision
any more than a mid-level tier of a pyramid can provide the founda-
tion for an entire pyramid.' 5
The second model of constitutional adjudication, constitutional
coherentism, permits departures from the strict hierarchy, asymme-
try, and uni-directionality of constitutional foundationalism.16 Con-
stitutional coherentism simply raises the possibility that a relevant
statute or administrative regulation could help justify, provide con-
tent for, or demarcate the legitimate scope of a constitutional provi-
sion.17 Constitutional coherentism thus permits the blurring or
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76-78 (stating that foundationalism builds
belief system from basic ideas, which generate, and hence justify, further beliefs and basic
ideas combined with generated ideas to justify and provide content to other notions).
13. See Sosa, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theony of Knowledge,
in 5 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 3 (P. French, T. Uehling &
H. Wettstein eds. 1980) (noting that basic principle of foundationalism requires that flow be
unidirectional, from foundational notions through rest of hierarchy); see also Van Cleve, supra
note 6, at 78 (relating unidirectional flow of ideas in foundationalist theory as necessary be-
cause basic beliefs cannot be influenced by those that they generate).
14. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 4 (arguing that foundationalism cannot have basic, self-
justified notions influenced orjustified by rest of hierarchy because basic principles would not
be self-justified or indubitable).
15. See id. at 3 (creating analogy of pyramid for foundationalism to illustrate its
organization).
16. See id at 7 (comparing coherentism with foundationalism and noting difference in
structural organization and flow of ideas because coherentism posits mutually supporting and
influencing notions); Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76-80 (contrasting coherentism with founda-
tionalism on basis of lack of hierarchy and symmetry of coherentism where all ideas may jus-
tify each other).
17. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 7 (positing that coherentism provides mutual interaction
between principles such that collection of various ideas support and inform each other); Van
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obscuring of the hierarchical structure within federal and state judi-
cial systems.18 At the very least, coherentism permits constitutional
and statutory provisions to be treated as somehow mutually sup-
porting, similar to the various planks of a raft.' 9
Constitutional coherentism may therefore strike many as not
merely unfamiliar, but as viciously circular, as a recipe for chaos or
tyranny, and as constitutionally illegitimate. This Article attempts
to prove these first impressions false and to demonstrate constitu-
tional coherentism's genuine theoretical and practical value. In par-
ticular, the coherentist model permits the promotion of morally
legitimate democratic influences on the process of constitutional ad-
judication without impinging upon the counter-majoritarian charac-
ter of the Constitution. The first part of this Article discusses the
distinction between constitutional foundationalism and constitu-
tional coherentism and, in particular, seeks to defend the value and
legitimacy of constitutional coherentism.
For now, setting the stage for such a discussion requires a few
qualifications and disclaimers. First, both models appear in numer-
ous configurations. In particular, advocates of each approach differ
about the "breadth" of constitutional foundationalism or coherent-
ism; that is, the variety of authorities that constitutional adjudication
may legitimately consider.20 The distinction between the models in
no way erases conflicts over recourse to material beyond the consti-
tutional framers' intent2' or over the importance of tradition in due
process cases. 22 Both constitutional foundationalists and constitu-
Cleve, supra note 6, at 76 (setting forth coherentism as positing a set of principles that influ-
ence and justify each other so that no privileged notion stands alone as basic or fundamental).
18. See C. DUCAT & H. CHASE, CONsTrrTUONAL INTERPRETATION 546-47 (1983) (setting
out traditional relationship between federal and state judicial systems in which Supreme
Court settles conflicts between national and state interests giving substantial weight to na-
tional power).
19. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 3 (analogizing coherentism to structure of raft to illustrate
theory's structure of mutual support).
20. Compare Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in'FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20-46
(1961) (basing coherence theory of epistemology on subjects' disposition towards or agree-
ment with statements) with Popper, Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject, in OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE 106-52 (1972) (founding coherence theory solely on logical relationship between
propositions). Compare also Alston, supra note 6, at 165 (discussing foundationalist theory of
justification of beliefs as basic foundation) with Annis, supra note 6, at 345 (theorizing that
basis for foundationalism is objective truths).
21. Compare Bork, supra note 2, at 383-84 (focusing on original intent in constitutional
interpretation) with Perry, supra note 2, at 588-89 (advocating more expansive, inclusionary
approach to sources of constitutional insight).
22. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
(looking solely to tradition as embodied by jurisdictional statutes and practice to determine
process due) with id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing that tradition important to
due process analysis but also advocating independent due process inquiry). See also infra notes
49-74 and accompanying text (discussing Burnham opinions and characterizingJustice Scalia's
approach as coherentist andJustice Brennan's as involving coherentist element). The Burn-
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tional coherentists must, although perhaps on different grounds,
adopt some rule as to what kinds of arguments should inform con-
stitutional adjudication.23 This task might best be accomplished on
pragmatic grounds. 24 Recognizing the value of constitutional
coherentism may, however, affect our judgment as to what is really
necessary in this regard.
Second, contemporary philosophical schools by analogy allow for
other models of constitutional adjudication based on philosophical
alternatives to foundationalism and coherentism.2 5 Focusing on
foundationalism and coherentism, however, demonstrates the his-
ham opinions develop a debate begun the previous term. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
109 S. Ct. 2333, 2336 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding statute on grounds of long-estab-
lished surrounding tradition) with id. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for rejection
of statute and stating that tradition-based analysis is inappropriate because concept of tradi-
tion is malleable and elusive).
23. See R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 459 (1990) (observing that no fixed
bounds exist in defining appropriate argument in law). Consider as well the possibility that
hypothetical cases may, on some occasions, carry more conviction than real case precedents.
See Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 247
(1990) (critiquing sole reliance on precedent in deciding cases because hypothetical cases
provide better guidance for future of rule established in instant case). Into the mix may be
thrown arguments that legal theories, as opposed to legal generalities, grasped without distil-
ling a legal theory, are unnecessary in legal adjudication. See Lipkin, supra note 3, at 832
(summarizing various ideologies but arguing that legal rules, not theories of law, should gov-
ern decision of cases).
24. See Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. I.J. 469,476 (1987) (arguing in tort
context against broad, inclusive considerations used in case adjudication as generating results
inferior to those reached under fixed rules); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Prod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (opining that number of factors for analysis should be
limited to achieve less confusion and hence superior result). Epstein suggests an inevitable
tradeoff exists between the "validity" and the "reliability" of an approach to adjudication. See
id. at 470 (characterizing validity as identifying ultimate thing to be measured and reliability as
insuring repeatable measurements). Thus, an approach which considers a greater number of
factors is not inherently superior. See id. at 476 (asserting that consideration of numerous
factors seems optimal but results in unpredictable battle of experts). The need to consider a
greater number of factors, especially in the absence of crisp rules establishing their weight,
tends to undermine the quality and predictability of the adjudicatory process. Id. In the con-
text of constitutional adjudication, this thesis implies that a broadly inclusive constitutional
foundationalism or coherentism is not necessarily more appropriate.
25. See, e.g., A. GOLDMAN, EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 51-54 (1988) (setting forth reliabilism
theory where primary justification for beliefs attaches to disposition to act, with actual act as
secondary justification); R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 15-21 (1989) (advo-
cating pragmatic theory of truth through life experiences); R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHv AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE 12-13 (1979) (advancing idea that pictures and metaphors, rather than
affirmative statements, determine most people's philosophical convictions); Sosa, supra note
13, at 23 (accounting for people's actions under theory that person's prior disposition pro-
vides major justification for acts). Some theorists attempt to transcend the perceived defects
of both foundationalism and coherentism. See Kornblith, Beyond Foundationalism and the Coher-
ence Theory, 77J. PHIL. 597, 598 (1980) (asserting that foundationalism and coherentism inac-
curately state that knowledge is justified by true belief, rather than by experience); Shiner,
Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Activism, 3 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 33, 33 (1980) (developing
briefly hybrid model combining aspects of foundationalism and coherentism). For a recent
critique of Rorty's position, see Haack, Recent Obituaries of Epistemology, 27 Am,. PHIL. Q 199,
199-202 (1990) (providing reformist position accepting legitimacy of traditional projects but
repudiating idea of a priori knowledge or beliefs).
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toric importance of the former26 and the contemporary preemi-
nence of the latter.27 Such a focus also demonstrates the wide
variety of philosophical contexts in which foundationalism and
coherentism have been applied, including theories of moral and fac-
tual belief justification, 28 belief revision,29 values,30 ethics, 31 juris-
prudence,3 2 and the narrower realm of a pure theory of truth or
knowledge. 3
3
Based on these diverse uses, it appears reasonable to suspect that
the distinction between foundationalism and coherentism may
prove a valuable tool in constitutional adjudication. This applica-
tion need not involve detailed duplication of definitions and notions
developed in other contexts, but rather a mere utilization of the
26. See Cornman, Foundational Versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Knowledge, 14 AM.
PHIL. Q. 287, 287 (1977) (describing development of foundationalism as parallel to early de-
velopment of epistemic theories).
27. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RxGrrs SERIOUSLY 283 (rev. ed. 1978) (asserting that judges
make decisions by weighing whether plaintiff's or defendant's case better coheres with settled
law); Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the
Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 369 (1984) (maintaining that philosophers
developed coherence theories in attempt to avoid inadequacies of foundationalist accounts of
truth and justification).
28. See, e.g., Korner, On the Coherence of Factual Beliefs and Practical Attitudes, 9 AM. PHIL Q.
1, 5-7 (1972) (arguing that people do not cohere moral, scientific, and logical beliefs into one
belief system); Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 1061, 1112-13 (1982) (stating that
perceptual experiences compel factual judgments but moral feelings do not compel moral
judgments); Schneewind, Moral Knowledge and Moral Philosophy, in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOS-
OPHY, KNOWLEDGE AND NECEssrrY 249, 258-62 (1970) (discussing use of moral principles in
body of moral knowledge as basic, substantive entities that may not be overridden).
29. See, e.g., G. HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW 29-33 (1986) (presenting foundationalism as
tracking original beliefs and coherentism as focusing on present beliefs); R. NISBE'r & L.
Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 177 (1980)
(noting that people can be made aware of truth after holding false beliefs if made aware of
tendency toward holding false beliefs); Ross & Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process:
On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assements, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 147, 149 (P. Kaheman & A. Twerski eds. 1982) (relating lasting effects
of false information even after false belief rejected).
30. See Audi, Axiological Foundationalism, 12 CAN.J. PHIL. 163, 165 (1982) (averring exist-
ence of values which are justified directly and without basis in other values); D. ARMSTRONG,
BELIEF, TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE 95-96 (1973) (requiring that value be placed on every propo-
sition in order to form basis for beliefs).
31. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE 47 (1971) (viewing experience as part of
ethics system, not as merely contributing factor); DePaul, Naivete and Corruption in Moral In-
quiry, 48 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 619, 620 (1988) (finding formative experience and reasoning
experience as influences on ethics); Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedian Points, 10
CAN. J. PHIL. 83, 85-86 (1980) (forming moral judgments by moral principles coupled with
background theories about world).
32. See, e.g., Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1978) (admitting
possibility that case may have no right answer but stating that modern legal system makes
such possibility rare because of complexity and development); Raz, Legal Principles and the Lim-
its of the Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 826 (1972) (holding view that judges cite principles from both
within law and from outside sources).
33. See G. HARMAN, THOUGHT 67-71 (1973) (advancing notions of truth-based structure
and stating that truth depends on articulated sentences having proper structure within belief);
R. WALKER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 7 (1989) (believing truth stems from interac-
tion of ideals derived from real experience).
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general distinction between foundationalism and coherentism. This
Article next discusses how the constitutional case law currently em-
bodies, doubtless unconsciously, some sense of this distinction. Fi-
nally, the Article attempts to make the rough, implicit distinction
between foundationalism and coherentism found in constitutional
case law more explicit and defends the apparently problematic use
of coherentism in constitutional law.
I. FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM AS IMPLICIT WITHIN
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
A. Foundationalism as a Backdrop to Coherentism
It is not easy to characterize a typical constitutional case analysis.
The most typical depiction of constitutional interpretation involves
a foundationalist analysis because it views the Constitution as hier-
archically fundamental law. 34 For example, when a statute penaliz-
ing the possession of adult35 or child3 6 pornography within the
home is constitutionally challenged, foundationalist analysis seems
the most obvious model for deciding the case because first amend-
ment and privacy standards are assumed to be fixed and determi-
nate.37 The legal system presumes that the scope and content of the
relevant constitutional provisions are unaffected by the challenged
statutory provision. 38 This analysis prevents circular reasoning and
supports the Constitution's fundamental status. The statute is
viewed in the light of the Constitution to determine if it passes or
fails some appropriate constitutional test.3 9 Thus, the system main-
34. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (declaring Constitution
supreme law of land against which government actions measured); see also Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 325-26 (1816) (holding all state law subject to provisions of
federal Constitution). See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1969) (outlining structure of government with Constitution as source of all law).
35. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that first amendment prohibits
statutes criminalizing possession of obscene materials).
36. See Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (upholding against first amendment
challenge statute criminalizing possession and viewing of child pornography).
37. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560 (basing legal analysis on first amendment standards by
subjecting statute to tests of overbreadth and violation of free speech protections); Osborne,
110 S. Ct. at 1698 (analyzing statute under first amendment jurisprudence to determine if it
violates rights guaranteed by that amendment).
38. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (setting Constitution above statutes so that if
statute found violative of Constitution, statute must fall); see also Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1698-99
(determining validity of statute by reference to constitutional standards); Stanley, 394 U.S. at
560-62 (distinguishing present case from precedent, rather than re-interpreting Constitu-
tion's meaning, to determine violation of Constitution).
39. See Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178-80 (considering statute in light of constitutional
authority and determining it to be constitutional); see also Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1699 (deciding
statute passes test of overbreadth and therefore is constitutionally valid); Stanley, 394 U.S. at
564 (questioning whether statute passes test of permitting individuals to receive information
without government controlling content of thought).
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tains the hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship between consti-
tutional provisions and the statutes enacted thereunder.
B. Coherentism in Constitutional Decisions
These conclusions may seem self-evident and perhaps even un-
avoidably mandated by the idea of a Constitution.40 A dispassionate
examination of the case law suggests, however, that not all constitu-
tional analysis is clearly and unequivocally foundationalist.
1. Due process cases
Consider the well-known procedural due process analysis adopted
by Justice Rehnquist in a plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy4 1 and
in dissent in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.42 Both cases
concerned the adequacy of statutory procedures governing the dep-
rivation of substantive liberty or property rights granted by the
same statute.43 Justice Rehnquist's approach can be characterized
as a "strong" form of constitutional coherentism under which
purely statutory procedural rights not only influence, but exclusively
dictate, the scope of federal due process rights.44 In each opinion,
Justice Rehnquist advocated using statutory provisions alone to de-
fine due process rights.4
5
In contrast, the Supreme Court majority in Loudermill eventually
40. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77 (holding Constitution as law against which
government actions tested). See generally C. BLACK, supra note 34, at 74-90 (describing
Supreme Court's role in constitutional system as policing state and federal government ac-
tions to ensure conformity with federal constitutional guarantees); B. SCHWARIZ, CONSTrrU-
"rIONAL LAw (1972) (defining structure of government and laws with Constitution providing
ultimate justification).
41. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (plurality opinion) (finding due process clause
does not by itself expand job retention rights held by government employees, even when
employee has qualified statutory right not to be discharged except for cause).
42. 470 U.S. 532, 559 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority hold-
ing that due process requires pre-termination opportunity to respond to firing and post-ter-
mination administrative procedures).
43. Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 143 & n.9 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (citing 5
C.F.R. § 752.202(a) (entitling employee to thirty day notice of adverse action prior to re-
moval)) with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-40 n.6 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (concerning civil service employee entitlement to appeal of decision to
terminate).
44. Compare Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (advocating reliance on
statutory provisions to analyze constitutional requirements under due process) and Arneit, 416
U.S. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J.) (plurality opinion) (relying exclusively on statutorily prescribed
procedures to determine due process rights) with Sosa, supra note 13, at 4 (explaining coher-
entism as lacking hierarchical organization such that all values within set interact to provide
basis and definition for each other) and Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76 (defining coherentism's
structure as validation of beliefs through mutual support such that each notion informs
others).
45. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Arnett, 416 U.S. at 151-52
(Rehnquist, J.) (plurality opinion).
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held that the minimum constitutional rights enjoyed by an individ-
ual cannot be diminished by the procedures for deprivation speci-
fied by the statute.46 The Loudermill majority rejected not so much
coherentism itself, but rather Justice Rehnquist's controversial for-
mulation of it.47 According to his formulation, statutory rights pro-
vided not only one possible influence on rights, but exclusively
dictated the content or scope of constitutional due process rights.48
Other types of due process cases, by contrast, find justices, ordina-
rily divided along other lines, jointly adopting coherentist constitu-
tional analysis.
For instance, the recent case of Burnham v. Superior Court49 illus-
trates this point. Burnham involved the adequacy, under the due
process clause, of the service of a court summons and divorce peti-
tion upon a NewJersey resident visiting in California.50 The foreign
resident was voluntarily present within the State of California on a
temporary basis for reasons largely unrelated to the divorce suit.5 '
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, adopted a recognizably coher-
entist approach in concluding that the service of process comported
with the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" re-
quired by the due process clause.52 He observed that the legitimacy
of personal jurisdiction over physically present nonresidents stems
from "firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in Amer-
ican tradition," 53 mainly based on statutes and court decisions.5 4
This principle could be traced from Roman origins5 5 through Eng-
lish practice 56 to numerous nineteenth and early twentieth century
American state court decisions. 57 The opinion reported finding no
46. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980))
(determining that due process requires pre- and post-termination proceedings when firing
government employee, even for cause).
47. Id. at 559.
48. Id. at 562-63 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
50. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (1990) (involving wife's move to
California with children after which husband sought New Jersey divorce on desertion
grounds).
51. See id. (noting husband had little other connection to California).
52. Id. at 2110 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)) (upholding service by defining due process based on statutes and practice of courts
dealing with jurisdictional issues).
53. Id. (citing Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63, 67 (Conn. 1793)).
54. Id. at2116.
55. Id. at 2111 (citingJ. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 543, 554
(1946) and Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611-12 (No. 11,134) (C.C. Mass. 1928)).
56. Id. at 2110-11 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774) and Cart-
wright v. Pettus, 22 Eng. Rep. 916 (Ch. 1675)).
57. Id. at 2111-12 (citing Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 285, 3 So. 321 (1887); Roberts v.
Dunsmuir, 75 Cal. 203, 204, 16 P. 782 (1888); Hart v. Granger, I Conn. 154, 165 (1814);
Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 751, 169 So. 391, 392-93 (1936); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa
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state or federal statute or decision under state law that abandoned
in-state service as a basis of jurisdiction.58
According to Justice Scalia's analysis, this general state of the law
established both the due process clause's content and the continu-
ing vitality and widespread acceptance of the traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.59 On this basis, Justice Scalia deter-
mined that no violation of Burnham's due process rights occurred. 60
The opinion concluded that 'ijurisdiction based on physical pres-
ence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continu-
ing traditions of our legal system that define the due process
standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "61
What makes this approach coherentist is not the appeal to tradi-
tion or to vaguely ethical standards of fair play and substantial jus-
tice, but the recourse to relevant state and federal statutes. 62 Justice
Scalia considers the substantive content of state and federal jurisdic-
tional statutes in order to establish the relevant traditions and re-
quirements of fair play and substantial justice.65 This in turn
establishes the substantive content and the scope of the require-
0
116, 120-21 (1872); DePoret v. Gusman, 30 La. Ann., pt. 2, pp. 930, 932 (1878); Savin v.
Bond, 57 Md. 228, 233 (1881); Baisleyv. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544,549-50,21 S.W. 29,30 (1893);
Mussina v. Beldin, 6 Abb. Pr. 165, 176 (N.Y. 1858); Reed v. Hollister, 106 Or. 407, 412-14,
212 P. 367, 369-70 (1923); Vaugn v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, 280, 188 A. 299, 302 (1936); Bowman
v. Flint, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 29, 82 S.W. 1049, 1050 (1904); Vinal v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1, 20
(1881)).
58. Id. at 2113.
59. See id. at 2116 (ruling no violation of due process when jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone by analyzing state and federal jurisdictional statutes and court procedures to
interpret "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
60. lId
61. Id. at 2115.
62. Compare id at 2110-16 (reviewing statutes on jurisdiction to determine meaning of
due process test) with Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76 (defining coherentism as interaction of
elements within system to provide meaning to each other). Justice Scalia utilized coherentism
the previous term in defining a sufficient liberty interest for purposes of invoking due process
clause protection. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) (upholding de-
nial of hearing on probable natural father's petition for visitation rights and for establishment
of paternity). Justice Scalia concluded that only those interests "traditionally protected by our
society" count as sufficient liberty interests. Id. One indicator of whether an interest tradi-
tionally received protection is whether statutory law protected it. Id. at 2341 n.2. Thus again,
the scope and content of constitutional rights depend, in part, upon the scope and content of
the statutory rights ordinarily justified by conformance with the Constitution, their suppos-
edly fundamental source. Justice Brennan's dispute withJustice Scalia in Michael H. concerns
the types of sources of law that may be consulted, but not the legitimacy of the approach. See
id. at 2349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that concept of liberty should gather
meaning from experience). Because our experience presumably includes, as one component,
statutory and regulatory enactments,Justice Brennan's approach in Michael H. is at least com-
patible with constitutional coherentism.
63. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2105-06 (relying on case precedent as well as statutes to
interpret due process clause requirements).
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ments imposed by the due process clause of the Constitution. 64
Therefore, the precise type of statute challenged on constitutional
due process grounds helps decide, in the relevant respects, what the
due process clause of the Constitution permits, requires, and pro-
hibits. To determine whether the statutes are constitutional, we
look to the due process clause. To determine what the due process
clause requires, however, we look in part to statutes of the sort be-
ing challenged.
At least some, if not all, of the relevant state and federal statutes
on personal jurisdiction were no doubt drafted in an effort to com-
ply with the requirements of the due process clause. This circum-
stance, however, neither alters the apparent circularity, whether
vicious or virtuous, of Justice Scalia's procedure, nor does it alter
the apparent violation of the hierarchy of justification between the
"foundation" of the Constitution and the dependent "superstruc-
ture" of state and federal statutes. Justice Scalia's procedure looks
to the constitutionally challenged statutory practices to give mean-
ing, content, and limits to the due process clause by which those
statutes are to be tested.
It is useful to recognize thatJustice Brennan's concurring opinion
in Burnham,65 despite the extent to which it departed from Justice
Scalia's approach in other respects, never objected to constitutional
coherentism itself.66 Justice Brennan willingly considered state and
federal jurisdictional statutes and the practices thereunder as evi-
dence of what the due process clause requires. 67 In contrast to Jus-
tice Scalia, Justice Brennan understandably refused to confine the
inquiry solely to traditionally accepted state or federal statutory
practice. 68 Although he found such tradition or "pedigree" rele-
vant, it was by itself rarely dispositive, and Justice Brennan con-
cluded that an independent inquiry into the process that is due must
be undertaken. 69
64. See id. at 2115 (establishing traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to
determine constitutionality under due process clause).
65. 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Compare id (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing use of federal and state statutes to
aid determination of what due process requires) with id. at 2116 (majority opinion) (embark-
ing on analysis of due process based on state and federal jurisdictional statutes).
67. See id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring) (utilizing general statutory background and
court practice to help decide process due, but also undertaking independent constitutional
analysis).
68. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 2120 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that reference to "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) was not intended to exclude nontraditional or contemporary notions, but
only to indicate that fair play and substantial justice are notions that law traditionally main-
tained, perhaps in changing or evolving forms).
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To the extent that a judge determines the contours of constitu-
tional provisions by consulting sources such as learned treatises, law
review articles, contemporary moral theory or popular moral senti-
ment, or his or her own sense of propriety, the judge may be ajudi-
cial activist, but is not a coherentist.70 For example, a moral theory
or a law review article advocating change or continuity in the law
may, for the sake of argument, be a legitimate source of even consti-
tutional law.71 Moral theory and law review articles, however, fall
outside the structural hierarchy of legal rules under which justifica-
tions flow uni-directionally from a constitutional level to a statutory
level to an administrative/regulatory level. 72 Normative moral the-
ory and law review articles, unlike statutes or regulations, are not
governed and controlled by any other hierarchical level of the law.
Statutes and regulations are, however, governed by the Constitu-
tion. No one believes that the Constitution or statutes, or rulings
thereon, should control the conclusions reached by moral theorists
or the authors of law review articles. In this sense, they are outside
the hierarchy. Thus, looking to moral sentiment, law review articles,
or other sources is not coherentist because it does not equalize the
presumed hierarchical levels of legal hierarchy or make reciprocal
the elements of that hierarchy. 73
Justice Brennan relied in part on a form of coherentism in Burn-
ham when he invoked an analysis of statutes, but the independent
70. See W. LASSER, THE LIMITS OFJUDICIAL POWER 264 (1988) (describing era ofjudicial
activism as Supreme Court expanding applicability of Bill of Rights to states and assuming
direct supervision of state and local activities such as race relations, education, and family
values, often contrary to legislative will); S. SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONsTrrutmoN 208-10, 212-14 (1990) (characterizing judicial activism as product of 1930s
Court crisis and replacing reasonableness rule and judicial deference to legislative interpreta-
tions of Constitution with aggressivejudicial defense of individual rights guarantees of Bill of
Rights); Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation" The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1, 8-12 (1986) (discussing theories underlying constitutional interpretation and defin-
ing judicial activism as making, rather than interpreting, laws).
71. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring predeprivation hearing before
termination of welfare benefits, apparently inspired by Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1963) (asserting increased need to safeguard public against unfair deprivation of govern-
ment largess and suggesting creation of broader property definition thus protected by due
process)).
72. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 136, 176-77 (1803) (regarding Constitu-
tion as fundamental and paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means so that legislative
acts to contrary not valid law); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (subjecting
legislative power to careful review under Constitution to preserve freedom); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting Article VI statement of Constitution as supreme law of land,
binding on states); Berger, supra note 70, at 3-8 (opining authoritativeness of Constitution
and concluding that its supremacy over statutes and administrative regulations has never been
questioned).
73. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 18 (defining coherentism as relationship of beliefs within
particular system such that set of beliefs is mutually supporting). External referents may,
however, be used to test a coherentist system. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text
(advocating use of external standards to test coherentist system).
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inquiry he called for involves an interpretive approach not rooted in
coherentism.74 Coherentism's general proponents, though, include
judges such as Justice Brennan not conventionally thought of as
conservative or as opposing judicial activism. Nor is constitutional
coherentism confined only to due process cases. The Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence employs constitutional
coherentism as well.
2. Equal protection cases
Some suggest that the statutory requirements for affirmative ac-
tion plans under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 75 are the
same as the constitutional requirements of the equal protection
clause.76 Such a view does not necessarily involve coherentism. To
determine whether coherentism is involved, we must explore the re-
lationship between the requirements of Title VII and the equal pro-
tection clause. 77 Coherentism will be involved, regardless of the
similarity or difference between the standards, if the statutory stan-
dards independently affect or help determine the equal protection
clause's requirements.78 Coherentism certainly permits holding a
statute incompatible with a constitutional provision and striking it
down on that basis as unconstitutional.7 9 Obviously, constitutional
provisions hold the power of life and death over statutes.80 Coher-
entism suggests, however, that constitutional provisions may, in
some instances, receive their very meaning and content in part from
74. Compare Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring) (advocating due pro-
cess inquiry employing statutory and court practice analysis to determine process due) with id.
(concluding that independent inquiry into scope of due process also necessary to account for
issues such as intent of Constitution and society's needs).
75. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(c)-
2000(h)(6) (1988)).
76. SeeJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 649 (1987) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (finding that proper inquiry in evaluating legality of affirmative action plan is same as
equal protection standard of employer having firm basis for believing that remedial action
required); see also G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
1990 SUPPLEMENT 92-93 n.* (1990) (noting that statutory-based opinion in Johnson "widely
interpreted" as setting constitutional standards as well).
77. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 18 (explaining that coherentism focuses on relationships
between beliefs within system); Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76 (describing coherentist model
as one justifying beliefs by membership in and coherence with set of mutually supporting
beliefs).
78. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 20 (noting that coherent belief system survives by mutual
support of beliefs that inform and generate each other).
79. See Kress, supra note 27, at 370-72 (stating that coherence must attain certain level of
consistency and that beliefs not reaching requisite level of coherence cannot belong to that set
of beliefs).
80. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 136, 176-77 (1803) (concluding that legis-
lative act contrary to Constitution is not law); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59
(1983) (holding single House legislative veto of Attorney General decision violative of separa-
tion of powers and hence invalid).
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statutes enacted pursuant to those constitutional provisions.81
Such coherentist jurisprudence does seem to exist in equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 8 2 provides a recent example. Jus-
tice O'Connor observed that the Court faced no Title VII or other
statutory issue; the case rested solely on an interpretation of the
equal protection clause.83 Justice O'Connor also noted that states
possess not only the constitutional ability, but also the constitutional
duty to "eliminate the continuing effects of past unconstitutional
discrimination."8 4
The question then arises of what the equal protection clause per-
mits or requires of states in this sensitive area. In Wygant, Justice
O'Connor answered that "reliable benchmarks" for this determina-
tion exist.85 The "reliable benchmark" provided by Justice
O'Connor turns out to be the conditions "sufficient to support a
prima facie Title VII pattern or practice claim ... ."86 Justice
O'Connor's analysis extends beyond the conclusion that the re-
quirements of the Constitution and of the statute happen to coin-
cide in this respect.8 7 In particular, she concludes that in order to
determine what equal protection requires or permits, employers
should simply use the reliable guide of a prima facie violation of the
statute.88
This conclusion may raise the possible objection that the statutory
requirements act as a reliable guide to the substance and meaning of
the equal protection clause only because the statute was drafted to
parallel the requirements of the equal protection clause. Further-
more, changes in the relevant equal protection jurisprudence might
81. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 20 (explicating interrelationship of beliefs to provide
meaning and content to other beliefs in set as basic coherentism).
82. 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that issue of whether Constitution prohibits union and school board from devel-
oping plan apportioning layoffs between racial groups to preserve affirmative hiring policy
requires court to define and apply equal protection clause standards).
84. See id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (recognizing that states' duty to eliminate
past effects of discrimination justifies voluntary race-conscious action to achieve compliance
with law, even absent specific finding of past discrimination).
85. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that reference to Title VII standards
guides states as to equal protection duties in employment context).
87. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (making constitutional analysis exact duplicate of
Title VII analysis when applied by state employers to guide equal protection issues).
88. Id. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Of course, whether a statute is violated in a
given case may be a function of judge-made standards, as well as judicial attempts to deter-
mine the legislative intent underlying the statute. In any event, legislative or judicial stan-
dards putatively controlled by relevant constitutional standards are being used, directly or
indirectly, to give meaning and content to the relevant constitutional provisions themselves.
1371
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be viewed as feeding back into Title VII jurisprudence, providing
the only source of change in Title VII jurisprudence.8 9 One sus-
pects, however, that the statute is a reliable guide to the Constitu-
tion in part because our sense of what is permissible or required
under the statute tends to have some effect on what we think the
equal protection clause requires.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Wygant intimates the same coherentist
logic,90 expressing themes vaguely similar to Justice Scalia's analy-
sis in Burnham.91 In Wygant, Justice Marshall argued that:
When an elected school board and a teachers' union collectively
bargain a layoff provision designed to preserve the effects of a
valid minority recruitment plan by apportioning layoffs between
two racial groups, as a result of a settlement achieved under the
auspices of a supervisory state agency charged with protecting the
civil rights of all citizens, that provision should not be upset by
this Court on constitutional grounds.
92
Again, several reasons likely underpin Justice Marshall's disinclina-
tion to overturn on equal protection grounds affirmative action set-
tlements arrived at in accordance with relevant civil rights statutes.
93
One such reason stems from the sense that what relevant civil rights
statutes require or allow may or should affect a judgment of the
scope and content of the equal protection clause.
3. Justice Brennan on the death penalty
Constitutional coherentism may also be detectable as a single ele-
ment within a predominantly foundationalist analysis. Consider, for
example, Justice Brennan's well-known concurring opinion in
89. See generally B. LINDMAN-SHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATbON LAW
983-1012 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing history of Civil Rights Acts). Congress passed Title VII
pursuant to the commerce clause. 110 CONG. REC. 7202-12, 8453-56 (1964). See Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1964) (citing legislative history to
find Title VII valid exercise of commerce clause power). Congress subsequently amended
Title VII in 1972 to extend its coverage to state and local government employees under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976) (upholding 1972 amendments to Title VII as valid exercise of fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection clause power over eleventh amendment state sovereignty); Shawer v.
Indiana Univ. of Pa., 602 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that Congress clearly
extended Title VII to state and local government employees pursuant to fourteenth
amendment).
90. Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text (characterizing Justice Scalia's analysis
of due process requirement, based on state and federal jurisdictional statutes, as coherentist
because it involves interpretation by referring to mutually informative interrelationship be-
tween relevant set of rules).
92. Id. at 312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (focusing on history and application of settle-
ment at issue to demonstrate its constitutionality, not on which standard should be applied).
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Furman v. Georgia,94 which considered whether and under what cir-
cumstances the death penalty violates the eighth amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment.95 The opinion's
assertion that "[tihe primary principle [of the eighth amendment] is
that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the
dignity of human beings" illustrates the concurrence's foundational-
ist tenor.96 As concluded above, this type of moral principle rests
within foundationalist rather than within coherentist theory. 97 Jus-
tice Brennan believes this moral value to be a fundamental premise
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, rather than a
subordinate or inferior principle of law.
98
Much of the remainder ofJustice Brennan's argument proceeds in
similar foundationalist fashion.99 At one point, however, Justice
Brennan introduces a coherentist element. To determine whether a
particular punishment violates the prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment, Justice Brennan considers contemporary soci-
ety's acceptance or rejection of that particular punishment.100 By
itself, this argument is not necessarily coherentist, since acceptabil-
ity to society might refer solely to popular moral attitudes or other
foundationalist sources of law.' 0 ' Justice Brennan, however, looks
beyond those sources and specifies as one indicator of the contem-
porary acceptability of a punishment the extent of its statutory au-
thorization.10 2 Thus, Justice Brennan factors in the statutory
94. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring).
95. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (seeking
to hold death penalty unconstitutional as violation of eighth and fourteenth amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
96. Compare id. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring) (providing primary principle behind
eighth amendment analysis) with Annis, supra note 6, at 345-46 (defining foundationalism as
certain self-evident fundamental beliefs from which non-basic beliefs are directly derived). See
also infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (describing foundationalist theory and its appli-
cation to broader constitutional analysis and interpretation and positing Constitution as ulti-
mate touchstone in adjudicating cases).
97. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing moral theory and law review
articles and other legal scholarship as outside formal legal hierarchy and hence not example
of coherentism).
98. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. See itL at 271-82 (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing elements to be considered when
evaluating whether punishment is cruel and unusual, including framers' intent, common no-
tions of human dignity, severity and arbitrary nature of punishment, and its excessiveness).
100. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. See Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 74-76 (defining coherentism and foundationalism such
that if beliefs form basis of rather than inform decisions in unprivileged fashion they express
foundationalism); see also supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (finding moral attitudes fall
outside formal structure of legal rules and hence not coherentist elements within legal
system).
102. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan,J., concurring) (directing analysis toward legis-
lative authorization ofpunishment practices but concluding that legislative authorization does
not establish acceptance because acceptance is measured by use of punishment, not its mere
technical availability).
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existence of the punishment in other jurisdictions to decide its
constitutionality. 1 0 3
This inquiry is similar to the inquiry undertaken by Justice Scalia
and, again only as a portion of the task, by Justice Brennan some
years later in Burnham.104 As a recognizably coherentist analysis,
this examination establishes the contours and substance of a consti-
tutional provision in part by referring to the statutes enacted pursu-
ant to and held accountable under that provision. 05 This results in
a blurring or reciprocality of any purported hierarchy of authority
among the constitutional and statutory levels. Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Furman confirms that constitutional coherent-
ism is not simply a conservative device to validate the majority's in-
terests by reference to statutes enacted by the majority's
representatives and that constitutional coherentism arises in a vari-
ety of contexts.106
C. Griswold v. Connecticut.: Two Opinions Highlighting the Contrast
With only mild exaggeration, no model of constitutional analysis
deserves credit unless it discusses the well-known privacy case of
Griswold v. Connecticut.10 7 While much has been written about Gris-
wold,108 the distinction between foundationalism and coherentism
103. See id. at 278 (Brennan, J., concurring) (utilizing existence of punishment in other
jurisdictions as factor in conjunction with historic use and acceptance of punishment method).
104. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (reviewing Brennan concurrence in
Burnham and noting coherentist view embodied in its consideration of jurisdictional statutes
and practices).
105. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 18-20 (defining coherentism as examining beliefs within
context of mutually supporting set or system wherein member beliefs interrelate and inform
each other); Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76-77 (explicating coherentism as interrelationship of
beliefs within a mutually supporting system without hierarchical or fundamental structure).
Compare Annis, supra note 6, at 345-46 (setting forth foundationalist theory wherein certain
ideas form basis of system because of their self-evident nature).
106. See generally Bork, supra note 1, at 1-3 (advocating constitutional conservative ap-
proach by application of neutral principles rather than value-laden ones to mitigate anomaly
ofjudicial supremacy in democratic society); Meese, Toward a jurisprudence of Original Intent, I 1
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 5-12 (1988) (characterizing conservative approach to constitutional
analysis as one that assumes Constitution possesses discernable, intended meaning that must
be relied upon when interpreting text, rather than as approach that views Constitution as text
where meaning must be created by judges sensitive to social conditions or moral
philosophies).
107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding statute forbidding use of contraceptives by married
couples for contraceptive purposes violates right of privacy emanating from penumbra of
guarantees contained in Bill of Rights).
108. See, e.g., Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421-22 (1974) (con-
tending that reliance on penumbra of Bill of Rights to find privacy right is logically suspect
and contrary to principles of legal drafting); Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 994 (1979) (arguing that penumbra theory tortured Bill of Rights
into producing result, that Goldberg's reliance on ninth amendment was disingenuous given
its history, and that White's and Harlan's application of substantive due process received his-
torical vindication by adoption in later cases); Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privaty by the
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helps us account for the persistence of Justice Douglas' apparently
methodologically radical majority opinion. 10 9
In Griswold, Justice Douglas suggested that aspects of the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments have "emanations" that
form "penumbras" jointly establishing a constitutionally protected
"zone of privacy."' 10 The Court held that appellants' use of contra-
ception was within the zone of protected activity and therefore
struck down the statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives for
specified purposes.1 1 ' If Justice Douglas' opinion involved a com-
pletely novel or radical methodology, it would be difficult to ac-
count for its persistent influence. The distinction between
foundationalism and coherentism, however, permits a vision ofJus-
tice Douglas' opinion as more traditional in some respects than Jus-
tice Goldberg's generally less controversial concurring opinion."
2
In particular, Justice Douglas' approach, for all of its luminist met-
aphor, is much more purely and traditionally foundationalist than is
Justice Goldberg's concurrence. In determining that appellants' ac-
tivities received constitutional protection, Justice Douglas relied ex-
clusively on established constitutional rights.' 13 Those rights
formed the sole basis for zone of privacy. 1 4 The broader range of
possible sources of law played no role in creating a privacy right." 15
Most particularly, Justice Douglas never considered demarcating a
constitutional privacy right through reference to statutory law." 6
In contrast, Justice Goldberg's concurrence was at least ambiguous
Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 198 (suggesting that opinion deserves credit for not
applying substantive due process and relating right to contraceptives to familiar notions of
privacy).
109. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972) (extending privacy right to hold
unconstitutional statute banning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (explaining that fundamental right to privacy cre-
ated in Griswold was broad enough to encompass woman's decision to terminate pregnancy).
But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986) (refusing to recognize constitutional
privacy protection for consensual adult sexuality between gay men).
110. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (looking in particular at
such Bill of Rights protections as free speech, press, thought, and association; right against
enforced quartering of soldiers; right to be secure in person, house, papers, and effects; free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and protection against self incrimination).
111. See id. (finding constitutional violation at any time statute infringes upon protected
activities).
112. See id. at 486-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (relying exclusively on ninth amendment
as creating fundamental rights not explicitly enumerated in first eight amendments and re-
serving those rights to populace).
113. See id. at 481-85 (building right of privacy from aspects of various constitutional
amendments without reference to other sources of rights).
114. Id
115. Id.
116. Ik This approach follows foundationalism because the opinion accepts the basic
ideas, here constitutional rights, as given and builds a new idea (the privacy right) from that
foundation. Annis, supra note 6, at 345-46.
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about a coherentist approach to the constitutional right of pri-
vacy.117 Justice Goldberg argued for the need to look beyond con-
stitutional penumbras to "traditions""18 and to our collective
"experience with the requirements of a free society." 1 9 He con-
cluded that "the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right,
emanating 'from the totality of the constitutional scheme under
which we live.' ",120
By referring to the "totality of the constitutional scheme," Justice
Goldberg may conceivably have meant to invoke only constitutional
provisions. This interpretation, however, only leaves room for "tra-
ditions" and "experiences" at the explicitly constitutional level.
Justice Goldberg's language offers little support for such a narrow
interpretation.' 21 A more natural reading of the phrase includes
reference to federal and state statutory and regulatory enactments,
if not to other possible sources of law, to illuminate the constitu-
tional scheme. 122
117. See id at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (basing invalidation of statute on notion that
ninth amendment allows for existence of other constitutional rights, determined by referring
to society's traditions and collective experience). Justice Goldberg's opinion maintains that
the framers of the Constitution never intended the Bill of Rights to be an exhaustive list of
citizens' rights. Ida at 487. Rather, the framers' inclusion of the ninth amendment expressly
reserves those rights not enumerated to the people. Id. at 487-88.
118. Id. at 493 (Goldberg,J., concurring). References to "traditions" to help establish the
content of the due process clause have also been reasonably common, but most of the best
known of these cases never even implicitly commit to any degree of coherentism. See, e.g.,
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (holding involuntary stomach pumping for
narcotics violates due process by reliance on traditional due process guarantee of respect for
personal immunities); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (upholding statute al-
lowing state to appeal criminal verdicts partly due to prohibition against prosecution without
indictment not being fundamental principle ofjustice rooted in traditions and conscience of
people), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 793, 794 (1969); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (requiring defendant's presence during felony prose-
cution under due process clause because of compelling tradition favoring confronting one's
accusers). But see Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171 (referring to, among other considerations, "compel-
ling traditions of the legal profession" to describe content of due process clause). Presuma-
bly, the traditions of the legal profession, as a source of the content of the due process clause,
would include statutory and regulatory elements.
119. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (GoldbergJ., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 517 (1961) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (suggesting that judges must look to traditions and
collective conscience of populace when determining which rights are fundamental)).
120. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Ullman, 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)). Thus, the exclusively foundationalist character of Justice Douglas' opinion in
Griswold does not necessarily manifest an unequivocal commitment to reject constitutional
coherentism. Compare Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-85 (Douglas,J.) (creating zone of privacy from
text of constitutional amendments) with Ullman, 367 U.S. at 521-22 (advocating reference to
broader constitutional scheme in arguing that anti-contraceptive statute was unconstitutional
in case majority held lack of case or controversy). Justice Douglas' use of this phrase in Ullman
leaves unclear whether he intended to include statutory and regulatory strata within "the to-
tality of the constitutional scheme." See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 521 & n.13 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
121. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (seeming to suggest that anal-
ysis requires view towards traditions outside of constitutional context).
122. See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten:
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The most natural reading of Justice Goldberg's opinion, there-
fore, suggests that the existence and contours of a constitutional
right of privacy should be determined in part by considering the
content of relevant statutory and regulatory enactments. 123 This
method of constitutional evaluation therefore amounts to a coher-
entist approach.1 24 Justice Douglas' generally more methodologi-
cally controversial approach provides the traditional foundationalist
foil to Justice Goldberg's less traditional coherentism.
Overall, it is safe to conclude that coherentism, in one form or
another, appears as a common feature in important contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence. The method's use by judges, however,
fails to prove its inherent logic or normative value, in light of the
hierarchical structure and self-justifying presuppositions of the con-
stitutional system. Furthermore, even if constitutional coherentism
is jurisprudentially and logically sound, its potential advantages
should be clarified.
Initially, constitutional coherentism may not seem promising.
Constitutional coherentism might appear viciously circular and in-
compatible with our sense that constitutional principles establish
the "foundation" upon which statutes must be grounded. As it
turns out, however, further examination of foundationalism and
coherentism in other contexts suggests a strong case for the logic,
legitimacy, and advantageousness of constitutional coherentism.
II. FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM IN THE BROADER
PERSPECTIVE
A. Foundationalism in the Legal System
Initially, the foundationalist model appears most naturally related
to the judicial process of arriving at correct or justified results in
constitutional cases. 125 Consider, for example, the view that
The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. .J. 235, 244-46 (1965) (discussingJustice Goldberg's belief that
ninth amendment shows framers' intent to protect fundamental rights although not enumer-
ated in first eight amendments); Redlich, Are There "Certain" Rights... Retained By the People, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 787, 793-98 (1972) (tracing framers' intent behind ninth amendment and
praising Goldberg's use of it in Griswold).
123. See Redlich, supra note 122, at 797-98 (noting that various sources help guide inter-
pretation of rights left to citizens under ninth amendment).
124. See Sosa, supra note 13, at 18-20 (stressing importance of mutually supporting ideas
in coherentist framework); Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76-77 (same).
125. See Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1988)
(noting that foundationalism is prevailing approach in constitutional scholarship, but criticiz-
ing foundationalism as non-viable because there are no objectively verifiable foundations);
Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615, 1617-27
(1987) (discussing scholars who apply foundationalist approach to first amendment and argue
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foundationalism "supposes that knowledge forms a structure, most
components of which are supported by a certain sub-set of compo-
nents that are not themselves supported by the former." 126
Foundationalism "holds that some of one's beliefs 'depend on'
others for their current justification; these other beliefs may depend
on still others, until one gets to foundational beliefs that do not de-
pend on any further beliefs for their justification."' 127
The analogy between foundationalism and the structure of our
legal system seems obvious. Constitutional provisions or proposi-
tions act as the bases or foundations upon which other legal norms,
such as those embodied in statutes and regulations, depend for jus-
tification.' 28 Of course, it stretches the analogy too far to suppose
that all of the Constitution's provisions are genuinely self-justifying,
self-evidently true, incorrigible, or indubitable. It is hardly self-evi-
dent, for example, that the Constitution should mandate a minimum
age for the President, or that such an age should be neither lower
nor higher than thirty-five years. 129 But foundationalism, in some
versions, neither requires nor claims that the basic or foundational
principles must be self-evident or indubitable. 30  Some judges
that first amendment has single unifying purpose from which answers to such issues may be
deduced); see also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (relating Supreme Court use of
foundationalist model in decisionmaking).
126. Alston, Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?, 29 PHIL. STUDIEs 287, 289 (1976) (provid-
ing definition of epistemological foundationalism in admittedly unspecific terms); see also Al-
ston, supra note 6, at 165 (according to foundationalism certain beliefs ("foundations")
justified outside any relationship to other justified beliefs, while other beliefs interrelate and
ultimately depend for justification on "foundations").
127. G. HARMAN, supra note 29, at 29 (asserting that foundationalism imposes no require-
ment of tracking original justifications for beliefs, whereas coherence theory does); see also
Annis, supra note 6, at 345 (defining traditional epistemic foundationalism as positing "vari-
ous self-justified or basic statements" from which nonbasic statements derive in direct linear
relationship); Bonjour, Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 1 (1978)
(stating thesis of epistemological foundationalism as "certain empirical beliefs possess[ing] a
degree of epistemicjustification or warrant which does not depend, inferentially or otherwise,
on the justification of other empirical beliefs, but is instead somehow immediate or intrinsic");
Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 74 (positing foundationalism as "class of propositions-the 'foun-
dations'--that are self-evident or immediately justified; and... every proposition that isjusti-
fied is so at least partly in virtue of standing in certain relations to the foundations").
128. See supra notes 34-39 (discussing application of foundationalism by Supreme Court
within structure of legal system).
129. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 5. For present purposes we set aside the question of
the extent of indeterminacy of this legal requirement. See Hutchinson, Democracy and Determi.
nacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 543 (1989) (arguing that all law
lacks determinacy and objectivity).
130. See Alston, supra note 126, at 289 (stating that while some foundationalists assert that
foundations are incorrigible, minimalists define theory as not requiring self-evident founda-
tion beliefs); Alston, supra note 6, at 185 (averring that foundationalism divested of claims of
infallibility or incorrigibility is most defensible); Audi, supra note 30, at 180 (asserting that
foundational values require no absoluteness or highly privileged justificatory status); Triplett,
Recent Work on Foundationalism, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 93, 98 (1990) (finding that basics require cer-
tain degree ofjustification, but no more so than the propositions theyjustify). But see generally
Kekes, An Argument Against Foundationalism, 12 PHILOSOPHIA 273 (1983) (claiming that founda-
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may suggest that their oath and scope of responsibility bind them to
decide cases only in accordance with the Constitution and not nec-
essarily to determine the justification, self-evident or not, of the rel-
evant aspect of the Constitution. 131 This view, however,
misperceives constitutional foundationalism. Under foundationalist
theory, judges need not pass on the self-evidently correct or self-
justifying nature of the presidential age requirement. Rather,
foundationalism requires the judge simply to assume the Constitu-
tion as the ultimate touchstone ofjustification for purposes of adju-
dicating a given case.' 32 Whether the Constitution itself attains
justification in some ultimate sense remains the task of legal philos-
ophers, not judges deciding particular cases.' 33
The model of foundationalism, then, seems applicable to the ex-
tent that our legal system is analogous to a brick wall, with a consti-
tutional layer as the "solid foundation supporting layer after
successive layer."' 34 To the extent that this analogy seems imper-
fect, or at least incomplete, the model of coherentism may be of
interest.
B. Coherentism in the Legal System
Coherentism generally refers to the view which accords the ulti-
mate source of justification for any belief to the relationship be-
tween and among all beliefs held by the believer.13 5 Coherentism
looks in particular to explanatory relations or relations of
probability or logic between or among beliefs. 136 In essence, coher-
entism holds that a belief receives justification wholly from its place
tionalism is committed to claim that incorrigible statements exist); Williams, Coherence, Justifica-
tion, and Truth, 34 REv. MErAPHYSIcs 243 (1980) (noting that foundationalism essentially
requires existence of "intrinsically credible" or "directly evident" beliefs capable "to serve as
ultimate terminating points for chains ofjustification").
131. See Farber, supra note 125, at 1332 (concluding that courts' practical need to resolve
constitutional cases and controversies prevails over any desire to supply theoretical justifica-
tion for decisions).
132. Id. (asserting that courts need not and do not rely on grand theoretical foundations
to justify decisions).
133. Id.
134. Rescher, Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization, 71 J. PHIL.
695, 698 (1974) (analyzing and contrasting foundationalism and coherentism as theories of
cognitive rationalization); see also R. NozicK, PHILOSOPHICAL ExPLORATIONs 3 (1981) (critiqu-
ing epistemological foundationalism because it is like pile of bricks in that removing one bot-
tom brick topples whole including insights derived independent of that starting point). For
further discussion of foundationalism by a leading contemporary proponent, see generally
Chisholm, A Version of Foundationalism, in 5 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN EPIS-
TEMOLOGY 543 (P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein eds. 1980) (asserting that foundational-
ism means that first person propositions are actually direct attribution of properties to
speaker from basic touchstones).
135. Sosa, supra note 13, at 18 (defining coherentism by comparing it to foundationalism).
136. Id.
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within a coherent system.'3 7 Coherentism thus requires some ac-
count or definition of "coherence."'' 3 8
We all hold certain ideas about what coherence means. Judges
recognize and think desirable the idea of coherence in the law. 13 9
At a first approximation, the concept of coherence seems clear
enough. The degree' 40 of coherence of a system of beliefs, norms,
or rules reflects such factors as the system's simplicity, 14 1 compre-
hensiveness or generality, 142 fecundity, 143 lack of internal conflict 144
or internal inconsistency, 45 refutability,146 internal organization, 147
and the lack of any ad hoc quality to the system's explanations. 48
137. Dancy, On Coherence Theories ofJustification: Can an Empiricist Be a Coherentist?, 21 AM.
PHIL. Q. 359, 359 (1984) (addressing definition of coherentism in context of debates within
coherentist school); see also Van Cleve, supra note 6, at 76 (explaining coherentism as asserting
that propositions become justified by membership in coherent system of beliefs, none of
which is self-evidentlyjustified). For extended accounts of coherentism, see N. RESCUER, TIHE
COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 23-24 (1982) (characterizing aim of coherence theory as af-
fording test or criterion of truth, not actually defining truth); R. WALKER, supra note 33, at 210
(opining that coherent system should be set of beliefs, not solely set of abstract propositions);
M. WILLIAMS, GROUNDLESS BELIEF: AN ESSAY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY 5-7
(1977) (raising question of whether epistemology constitutes coherent intellectual discipline).
138. See Dancy, supra note 137, at 354 (explaining "mutual explanatoriness" is condition
of coherent set); see also infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text (discussing elements of
coherent system of beliefs, norms, or rules).
139. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2396 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting because majority, while averring its ad-
herence to logic and coherence, instead strays from previously laid foundations) (quoting B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting societal need for stable and orderly de-
velopment of law and hence advocating adherence to precedent and use of one statute to
interpret related statute).
140. See Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge, 30 PHIL. STUDIES 281, 288
(1976) (finding generally that coherence is matter of degree).
141. See, e.g., G. HARMAN, supra note 29, at 29 (stating that to achieve coherence in belief
system one must simplify, organize, and reduce ad hoc nature of beliefs); P. ZIFF, EPISTEMIC
ANALYSIS 42-43 (1984) (believing coherence to be issue of logical structure with principle of
identity supplying relevant aspect of logical structure when it is questioned); Cornman, supra
note 26, at 293 (surveying factors comprising coherent belief system); Lipkin, supra note 3, at
868 (listing factors that lend coherence to belief system and stressing simplicity and fecundity
of system).
142. See, e.g., D. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 103 (1989)
(stressing comprehensiveness and generality of belief system in achieving consistency); Corn-
man, supra note 26, at 293 (noting comprehensiveness, simplicity, and fecundity as keys to
coherent belief system); Lipkin, supra note 3, at 868 (holding that greater comprehensiveness
of issues addressed by belief system achieves greater coherence of that system).
143. Cornman, supra note 26, at 293; Lipkin, supra note 3, at 868.
144. See Lehrer, The Coherence Theory of Knowledge, 14 PHIL. Topics 5, 9 (1986) (comment-
ing that systems with internal conflict rarely exhibit coherence unless that conflict is minimal).
145. See Lehrer, Coherence and the Racehorse Paradox, in 5 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY:
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 183, 190 (P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein eds. 1980) (ex-
plaining that systems should seek consistency over variety of situations to increase overall
coherence).
146. Cornman, supra note 26, at 293.
147. G. HARMAN, supra note 29, at 29.
148. See id. (noting that ad hoc decisions reduce consistency, comprehensiveness, and or-
ganization of belief system because of reactive, unthoughtful nature).
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When a system possesses a number of these factors to a great de-
gree, that system may be classified as elegant or beautiful. 149 A co-
herent relationship between and among a network of beliefs or
rules, legal or otherwise, thus involves more than mere consistency,
but something less than rigorous logical entailment. 150
In the specifically legal context, a judge engages in constitutional
coherentism to the extent that she relies on and considers the above
assumptions when deciding constitutional cases. 51 A coherentist
approach, therefore, legitimizes an interpretation of a constitutional
provision, such as the due process clause, 52 that arises at least in
part from considering statutes and regulations implicating the par-
ticular constitutional provision. 53 In coherentism, the relationship
between the due process clause and the statutes and regulations
challenged thereunder conforms not to the idea of foundation and
superstructure, or strict hierarchy, but of non-privileged status.
154
Just as an individual's reactions to a constitutional provision affect
149. Lipkin, supra note 3, at 868.
150. See Kress, supra note 27, at 370 (delimiting coherence as more strict than logical con-
sistency but less exacting than absolute mutual entailment); Plantinga, Coherentism and the
Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God, in RATIONALITY, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND MORAL COMMrr-
MENT 109, 129 (R. Audi & W. Wainwright eds. 1986) (agreeing with general outer limits but
noting that coherentists refine definition further); Note, Dworkin's Right Answer Thesis: A Statis-
tical Regression Coherence Model, 73 IoWA L. REv. 159, 167 (1987) (finding coherence theory to
include relationships between elements of different sets of beliefs whereas legal theory limited
to narrow use of relationships between elements of same set). For discussion of the problem
of achieving even mere consistency among decisions facing both foundationalist and coheren-
tist models ofjudicial decisionmaking, see generally Easterbook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95
HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982) (stating that inconsistent decisions must, on minimal assumptions,
be expected in light of multi-member composition of Court).
151. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990) (using coherentist
approach to find consistency between due process clause and legal system's traditions); Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying
coherentist approach by arguing that conditions satisfying Title VII pattern or practice are
reliable "benchmark" of equal protection clause for employer discrimination issues, thereby
finding consistency between Constitution and statute); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding harmony between values inherent in eighth amend-
ment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and political process in enacting statutes);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (marking test for eighth amendment as drawing on
evolving standards of society); see also supra notes 34-124 (discussing at length these decisions
as evidence of coherentism in constitutional adjudication).
152. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text (describing various uses of coherentism
in Supreme Court due process cases).
153. Cf Kress, supra note 27, at 370 (noting coherence achieved when beliefs fit within
system to certain level of consistency and entailment); supra notes 135-38 and accompanying
text (defining coherentism as justification of proposition based on its relationship to coherent
system of propositions). Thus, under a coherentist approach, where no proposition or belief
assumes primacy, a constitutional provision takes its meaning and scope from the system of
other constitutional provisions and the statutes and regulations to which it relates. See supra
notes 75-93 and accompanying text (explicating coherentist approach used by Supreme Court
in affirmative action between equal protection clause and Title VII).
154. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (arguing that statutes' substantive con-
tent helps define fair play and substantial justice requirements, which in turn informs substan-
tive content of due process clause).
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the ultimate interpretation or assessment of the related statutes and
regulations, so may the reaction to statutes and regulations legiti-
mately influence the interpretation of inescapably broad, 55 "open-
textured,"' 56 if not largely indeterminate, 157 constitutional provi-
sions. The coherentist's result in a particular case seeks to provide
the most satisfactory accommodation of the factors noted above, 58
recognizing and adopting the best "fit" into the system created
by the constitutional provision and its related statutes and
regulations. 15 9
C. Criticism of Constitutional Coherentism and Responses
This understanding of coherentism provides the basis for re-
sponding to three criticisms of constitutional coherentism. The first
critique contemplates an "insane" legal system which, as in a para-
noid nightmare, possesses all the requisite legal elements-regula-
tions, statutes, a constitution-that mutually support each other
with elaborate and detailed relationships, but is nevertheless com-
pletely insane or morally depraved. 160 A second critique is derived
from the possibility that constitutional coherentism may not gener-
ate unique results in particular cases.' 6 ' Conflicting judicial results
155. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2350 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing liberty and property as broad ideas, gathering meaning from experience and anal-
ysis) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) and National Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
156. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 121-32 (1961) (arguing that general rules,
principles, and standards must be main instrument of social control in large society).
157. See Hutchinson, supra note 129, at 543 (discussing indeterminacy of law in constitu-
tional context and noting swings in Supreme Court jurisprudence as evidence).
158. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (listing factors lending belief system
coherence, including simplicity, comprehensiveness, and internal consistency).
159. See Hurley, supra note 23, at 223 (characterizing judges' task as discovering theory
displaying most coherence); see also Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165,
170 (1982) (maintaining that valid interpretations "fit" data they are designed to interpret);
Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 498
(1990) (asserting that claim of existence of natural law requires assessment in light ofjudicial
precedents to determine its fit); Rescher, supra note 134, at 700 (claiming that nothing has to
be more fundamental than another thing as long as there is over-all fit, where every element
of the system interlocks with other elements). For a critique of Professor Dworkin's approach
in particular, see generally Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature,
60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982) (agreeing generally with Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation
but arguing that Dworkin often strays from his own arguments with fallacies of pure objectiv-
ity and pure subjectivity).
160. See, e.g., Kornblith, supra note 25, at 601 (noting that mere fact of coherence between
propositions does not evidence their truth); Sosa, Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge,
97 MIND 153, 167 (1988) (establishing main objective of coherentism as providing ability to
create coherent beliefs that lack relation to individual surroundings); Sosa, The Foundations of
Foundationalism, 14 Nous 547, 557 (1980) [hereinafter Sosa, Foundations] (referring to "prob-
lem of detachment from reality" in which coherent beliefs may be detached from surround-
ings and thus justification for set of beliefs may be internal).
161. See Cornman, supra note 26, at 296 (stating that by nature, singular observations are
all tested by similar observation and this leads to identity of results, even in slightly different
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in a particular case conceivably might be equally coherent with the
other elements of the legal system, but in different ways. 162 Finally,
coherentism may seem viciously circular because it justifies a statute
in part by reference to the Constitution, and justifies the Constitu-
tion in part by reference to the statute.1 63
By way of response, several points might be made. As to the sec-
ond criticism, regarding the possibility of equally coherent case law
outcomes, we must first be realistic in our expectations. Certainly
foundationalism has failed to generate uniquely correct answers to
questions of equal protection, due process, free exercise of religion,
or the right of privacy.' 64 Coherentism offers no less than what can
reasonably be expected: if two interpretations of a constitutional
provision seem equally coherent, we can either reconsider the
strength of our commitment to each element or strand of the net-
work of justification or consider some as yet unexamined element
from the system. 1
65
The problems of allegedly vicious circularity and of the possibility
of a perfectly coherent but "insane" legal system can be treated to-
gether. First, the possibility of mutually supporting legal principles
fails as reasonable grounds to dismiss constitutional coherentism.' 66
That would simply beg the question against coherentism. Critics
must demonstrate why this "circularity" is vicious or why it amounts
to no support at all under actual conditions. Second, coherentism
as used in constitutional case law need never exclude foundational-
ism.' 67 Coherentism may be unsuitable or unnecessary to solve a
particular constitutional problem, or the particular context may call
for supplementing a coherentist approach with a foundational ap-
circumstances); Sosa, Foundations, supra note 160, at 557 (referring to multiplicity of coherent
systems which may nonetheless lead to identical outcomes in certain situations).
162. See Sosa, Foundations, supra note 160, at 557 (describing multiplicity of coherent sys-
tems leading to different outcomes under auspices of one general system); see also supra notes
49-69 (discussing opinions of Justices Scalia and Brennan in Burnham as using coherentist
analysis but reaching opposite results).
163. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 n.2 (1989) (using statutes as indi-
cator of whether interest traditionally protected); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that violations of eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment should be determined in part by whether majority of
state statutes provide for such punishment). Compare infra note 171 and accompanying text
(asserting that coherentism's circularity is not vicious because it receives external validation).
164. See Farber, supra note 125, at 1338-39 (finding flaw in constitutional foundationalism
because of difficulty in ascertaining intended scope of various constitutional provisions).
165. See Bonjour, supra note 140, at 302-03 (observing that coherent system may be made
incoherent by subsequent input of experiences).
166. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining that coherent system may re-
ceive external verification).
167. See supra notes 41-106 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court use of
coherentism in due process and affirmative action contexts and noting that some justices use
foundationalism, while others employ coherentism).
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proach, or vice versa.168 Sometimes, the content of a constitutional
requirement in a particular case may be sufficiently clear on the ba-
sis of social or moral theory and the text of the Constitution
itself. 169
In addition, constitutional coherentism need not deny the possi-
bility, or even the need, for justification of its results that is external
to the legal system. A set of legal rules may be internally coher-
ent, 170 but that fact hardly precludes further testing of the system by
reference to some external standard. Potential benchmarks for
analysis include purely ethical beliefs or principles, the degree to
which the legal system fulfills social desires, or general beliefs about
human nature and social facts generally. 171 Seeking external justifi-
cation directly responds to those who insist on simultaneously chal-
lenging many or all of the mutually supporting beliefs or rules of the
system. Thus, the legitimacy of looking outside the legal system
reduces the fear of a coherent, but insane legal system or of a legal
system absurdly holding itself up only by its own bootstraps.172
However, even an admixture of coherentism may be thought ille-
gitimate because of the stratification inherent in the legal hierar-
chy. 173 Some legal writers therefore assume that constitutional
decisionmaking must be exclusively foundationalist.174 This view
misconstrues constitutional coherentism, which receives legitimacy
and justification from its recognition of the "open-texture" or the
168. Compare supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing foundationalism as
most obvious approach adjudicating challenge to anti-pornography statute) with supra notes
94-103 (describingJustice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
as supplementing foundationalist approach with coherentism).
169. See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960) (arguing that scope
of free speech clause is clear from its language). Unfortunately, the text does not go on to
indicate what is and what is not defined as "speech." See R.G. WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE
SPEECH LAW ch. 1 (1990) (theorizing that scope of free speech clause is determined by broad
range of norms or values coherently underlying that clause).
170. See G. HARMAN, supra note 29, at 33 (claiming that by nature, coherence of beliefs
means those beliefs are mutually supporting).
171. See Rescher, supra note 134, at 706 (arguing that coherentism's circularity is not vi-
cious because justification comes from both system-internal and system-external validations
which support whole network).
172. See Rescher, supra note 134, at 706-07 (concluding that external justification validates
internally consistent system by acting as reference point).
173. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (advancing various definitions of
coherentism, and noting that basic assumption posits justification of belief or rule as stem-
ming from place in coherent, mutually supporting set or system of beliefs).
174. See Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. LJ. 383, 387 (1985) (referring to
accepted premises, logical demonstrations, and more basic principles as roots of constitu-
tional theory); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 109 n.2 (1970) (Black,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (looking at specific language of constitutional provision and fram-
ers' intent); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (identifying
Court's duty as carrying out framers' intent).
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partial indeterminacy of constitutional language. 75 Coherentism
does not propose to turn the legal system on its head by generally
subordinating constitutional rules to statutory rules. 176 Coherent-
ism seeks only to make the best possible sense out of the legal sys-
tem as a whole. 77
D. Advantages of Coherentism
Upon reflection, then, the legitimacy of coherentism's role in con-
stitutional adjudication may seem well-established. Constitutional
coherentism might be legitimate, however, without being particu-
larly advantageous. As we shall see, constitutional coherentism
promises some affirmative advantages, and the avoidance of obvious
pitfalls.
As a practical matter, a full accounting of the merits of constitu-
tional coherentism extends beyond the scope of this Article. Some
of constitutional coherentism's advantages derive from the general
benefits of epistemic coherentism. The recent literature in this field
generally supports coherentism's preeminence over foundational-
ism.' 7 8 Of course, some of the disadvantages of epistemic founda-
tionalism may not apply to constitutional foundationalism, 179 and
coherentism is not universally admired.' 80 A global assessment of
coherentism versus foundationalism, then, is not possible within the
scope of this Article.
Perhaps the most obvious and important advantage of constitu-
tional coherentism, however, comes from its usefulness in legiti-
175. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (noting ambiguity and broad nature of
many constitutional provisions).
176. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (asserting that as constitutional provi-
sions give meaning to statutes, reactions to statutes may legitimately affect interpretation of
constitutional principles); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing mutual re-
lationship between statutes and values underlying due process clause).
177. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (arguing that right result in case is
most coherent one, or one providing best fit).
178. See, e.g., Bonjour, supra note 127, at 13 (concluding that "foundationalism appears to
be doomed"); Cornman, supra note 26, at 287 (finding himself virtually lone defender of
foundationalism); DePaul, supra note 31, at 619 (recording coherentism's emergence as domi-
nant approach in modem ethics); Kress, supra note 27, at 369 (noting predominance of coher-
ence and holistic theories of philosophy and waning of foundational empiricist theories);
Sosa, supra note 13, at 6 (expressing coherentism's recent vigor and interest in philosophical
circles); Triplett, supra note 130, at 93 (stating that contemporary philosophers believe
foundationalism is dead); see also R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 462 (referring to attack on
"foundations" of various thought systems).
179. See Bonjour, supra note 127, at 13 (raising problem of self-evident justification of
certain beliefs for foundationalism as epistemic theory). Constitutional foundationalists never
need face this issue because the Constitution is assumed, within the legal system, to be the
self-justified or at least unquestioned source of rules.
180. See Sayre-McCord, Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing, 66 PAc. PHIL. Q. 170, 170
(1985) (arguing that requirement that theories be coherent insures theories' incorrectness).
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mately restraining judicial arbitrariness and subjectivity. This
possibility manifests itself through coherentism's utilization of the
presumably more democratic influences of statutes and regulations
in resolving issues, without sacrificing the function of the Constitu-
tion to safeguard minorities against the tyranny of the majority.
Judges already interpret, or give content to, constitutional clauses in
part via recourse to sources such as law review articles.18' A recent,
commonly enforced statute generated by the democratic process
may present an equally valid basis for, constitutional interpretation.
In certain situations, of course, determining the scope and sub-
stance of a right by reference to majority desires defeats the purpose
of constitutional rights.'8 2 But these occasions merely limit the jus-
tifiable use of the model, or the influence of statutes under the
model, rather than totally invalidating its use.
Constitutional coherentism potentially restrains arbitrariness on
the part of the judiciary without simply substituting the tyranny of
the majority.' 8 3 It might still be thought, though, that the coheren-
tist model involves illegitimate methodological, if not political, con-
servatism.18 4 This critique revolves around coherentism's call upon
judges to fit case results into the overall structure of previously es-
tablished law.'
1 5
In response, it should first be remembered that non-conservative
judges reach non-conservative results by employing constitutional
coherentism. 8 6 In addition, while epistemic coherentism struggles
181. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting Charles Reich's law review article
that informed decision in Goldberg v. Kelly).
182. SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980) (defending countermajoritarian
function of Constitution and courts as check on tyranny by majority and protection for minor-
ity rights); see also Eule,Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1508 (1990) (as-
serting that judicial review should counter majoritarianism and considering in this light how
courts should decide constitutional challenges to voter enactments); Mitchell, The Ninth
Amendment and the 'Jurisprudence of Original Intention ", 74 GEO. LJ. 1719, 1742 (1986) (conclud-
ing principle that court protects minorities against majority is embodied in ninth amend-
ment); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (setting forth
importance of guarding against both oppression by rulers and oppression of one portion of
society by another). For some possible limits on the extent to which we might want to appeal
to "dead" or "obsolete" statutes, see generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATuTEs (1982) (discussing how unrepealed but obsolete statutes may excessively inform
our inquiry into law on particular subjects).
183. See supra notes 41-106 and accompanying text (asserting that constitutional coherent-
ism works within system of jurisprudential values, within which at least some constitutional
values may be given great credence and great weight).
184. See supra notes 41-124 and accompanying text (explicating constitutional coherent-
ism as attempt to determine meaning of constitutional provisions by reference to existing law
and tradition).
185. Id.; see also Hurley, supra note 23, at 239 (characterizing coherentism as possessing
element of conservatism because if case fits within coherent system of settled cases, it is
deemed correctly decided, because settled cases set standard).
186. See supra notes 65, 92, 102-03, 118-20 and accompanying text (providing instances of
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to accommodate the possibility of each relevant principle being si-
multaneously incorrect, 187 and the need to detect that state of af-
fairs, legal coherentism should not be condemned because of that
problem. 88 It is simply implausible that each and every legal princi-
ple, at every level of the legal system, is in fact simultaneously
wrong, thereby disabling coherentism from detecting that state of
affairs.' 8 9 It seems noteworthy that even the philosopher Richard
Rorty, whose disdain for traditional epistemology and traditional
moral and legal theory is well-established, ultimately adopts moral
and legal preferences not dissimilar to those of John Stuart Mill. 190
Constitutional coherentism provides for the possibility of rapid and
fundamental political and legal change. It may be that in a given
case, our sense of the injustice of a given outcome could be strong
enough to override the fact that the outcome coheres well with
many prior decisions and with other statutes.
Finally, to attain acceptance, constitutional coherentism must not
beg important and controversial questions. The rejection by coher-
entism of the privilege or special status of beliefs or rules in a hierar-
chical sense may seem ominous to some. Doesn't coherentism
preclude, from the beginning, even the possibility of a rule's objec-
tively being right or true? While it would take us far afield to answer
this important question, the brief, decisive answer seems to be
"no."'' Just as at least some forms of foundationalism deny the
objectivity of truth, 192 so coherentism is compatible with the objec-
tivity.' 98 Therefore, adoption of constitutional coherentism does
liberal judges utilizing coherentism to reach outcomes in death penalty, affirmative action,
and due process cases).
187. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text (relating problems of "insane" system
and circularity and noting that legal coherentism is not fatally wounded by such problems).
188. See id. (expressing view that legal coherentism tries to make sense of legal system by
involving all parts in decisionmaking process).
189. Id-
190. See generally Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL. 583 (1983) (arguing
that moral force of loyalties and convictions is wholly derived from conceptions of ourselves
as members of particular group, society, or nation).
191. Cf J. RAwLs, supra note 31, at 60, 136 (suggesting that all citizens would agree on
principles of justice forming basis of legal system if all citizens were in same positions of
wealth and status, which might suggest universal truth, but that such truth is illusory because
it is merely result of mutual support of many considerations).
192. See Annis, supra note 6, at 347-49 (advocating relative foundationalism as more plau-
sible than absolute); Triplett, supra note 130, at 100 (characterizing contextual foundational-
ists as contending that foundations vary with changing scientific, historical, or cultural
conditions). For a general discussion of this area, see Krausz, Relativism and Foundationalism:
Some Distinctions and Strategies, 67 MONIsT 395, 396-97 (1984) (emphasizing differences be-
tween foundationalism and absolutism and noting that foundations of beliefs may change in
foundationalism).
193. See D. BRINK, supra note 142, at 141 (claiming that if moral beliefs cohere with realist
second-order beliefs about reality, then coherence provides evidence of objective moral
truth); R. WALKER, supra note 33, at 4 (providing one form of coherentism where truth is
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not inadvertently commit the legal system to controversial philoso-
phies about relativism and the objectivity of truths and values.
CONCLUSION
This discussion has established some basic distinctions between
the foundationalist and coherentist constitutional models and ex-
amined in particular the more exotic model, constitutional coher-
entism, insofar as the case law implicitly employs it. The examples
of implicit constitutional coherentism only touch the surface of a
fully articulated constitutional coherentism. For those judges in-
trigued by the unexplored possibilities of constitutional coherent-
ism, further guidance, by way of analogy, is beginning to become
available. Current developments in moral philosophy present some
fairly elaborate models of coherentism.19 4 As the insights of coher-
entist moral philosophers become systematized, coherentism's avail-
ability for use in constitutional jurisprudence increases.
Overall, proper recourse to the model of constitutional coherent-
ism offers certain practical advantages without comparable costs. In
appropriate cases, if a judge or a society believes independently,
strongly, and dispassionately in the fairness of the relevant statutes,
that commitment should contribute to the judge's reading of the
open-ended or general constitutional provisions supposedly con-
trolling those statutes.19 5 Dismissing coherentism unjustifiably as-
sumes, contrary to the well-established case law jurisprudence of
judges across the ideological spectrum, that all constitutional rea-
soning must be foundationalist rather than coherentist. A dismissal
of constitutional coherentism overlooks a source of legitimate dem-
ocratic control over judicial arbitrariness and subjectivity, and does
not protect more securely the rights of minorities.
coherence with God's belief system); Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in
Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256, 277 (1979) (stating that divergence among various systems of beliefs
does not imply lack of objective truths). For a general discussion of the implications of the
plurality of moral belief for moral objectivism, see Wright, The Consequences of Contemporary
Legal Relativism, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 73 (1990).
194. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 46-51 (expounding wide reflective equilibrium theory
that brings many different belief sets into single system to achieve broader equilibrium or
coherence); see also id. at 21 (describing conception of justice not as involving self-evident
principles, but as justification from mutual support of many considerations, fitting into coher-
ent system). Among the leading exponents of Rawlsian coherentism is Professor Norman
Daniels. See Daniels, supra note 193, at 257 (asserting that Rawlsian coherentism resolves
some traditional worries regarding objectivity of ethics); Daniels, supra note 31, at 90 (arguing
that Rawls' theory brings together theories of person, procedural justice, and morality); see
also DePaul, The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics, 18 CAN.J. PHIL. 67 (1988)
(supporting Rawls' thesis of many different belief sets integrated into single personal system).
195. See DePaul, supra note 194, at 85 (imparting message that coherentism should not be
unduly influenced by differences in "levels" of beliefs or rules).
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